Free PDF Choose Your Weapons, by Douglas Hurd
Never ever question with our deal, since we will certainly always provide what you require. As like this upgraded book Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd, you may not discover in the various other location. Yet right here, it's really easy. Just click and also download, you could have the Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd When simpleness will alleviate your life, why should take the challenging one? You could buy the soft documents of the book Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd right here and also be member of us. Besides this book Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd, you could likewise locate hundreds lists of guides from several resources, compilations, publishers, and also authors in worldwide.
Choose Your Weapons, by Douglas Hurd
Free PDF Choose Your Weapons, by Douglas Hurd
Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd. Allow's review! We will certainly frequently learn this sentence almost everywhere. When still being a youngster, mom made use of to buy us to always read, so did the instructor. Some publications Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd are fully checked out in a week and also we need the responsibility to sustain reading Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd What around now? Do you still enjoy reading? Is reading simply for you which have commitment? Absolutely not! We below provide you a brand-new book entitled Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd to review.
Definitely, to boost your life top quality, every e-book Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd will have their particular driving lesson. Nonetheless, having specific recognition will make you really feel much more confident. When you feel something happen to your life, in some cases, reviewing e-book Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd could assist you to make calmness. Is that your actual hobby? Often of course, but occasionally will be uncertain. Your choice to read Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd as one of your reading e-books, could be your proper publication to read now.
This is not about exactly how a lot this publication Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd costs; it is not also concerning just what type of e-book you really like to read. It has to do with what you could take as well as receive from reviewing this Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd You can like to choose other e-book; yet, it matters not if you try to make this publication Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd as your reading option. You will certainly not regret it. This soft file book Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd can be your excellent pal in any sort of instance.
By downloading this soft file publication Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd in the on the internet link download, you remain in the initial step right to do. This website actually supplies you convenience of ways to obtain the most effective book, from finest vendor to the brand-new released e-book. You can discover a lot more e-books in this website by going to every web link that we supply. Among the collections, Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd is one of the most effective collections to market. So, the first you get it, the very first you will certainly get all good for this e-book Choose Your Weapons, By Douglas Hurd
When writing his magnificent life of Robert Peel, Douglas Hurd found himself caught up again in a debate that has always fascinated him - the argument between the noisy popular liberal interventionist approach and the more conservative diplomatic approach concentrating on co-operation between other nations. The argument has run for two centuries - and is at the heart of heated discussion on both sides of the Atlantic today.
Hurd concentrates on personalities and circumstances. He begins with the dramatic antagonism after Waterloo between Canning (liberal, populist, interventionist) and Castlereagh (institutions, compromise, real politics) - the last occasion on which ministerial colleagues fought a duel. A generation later comes Palmerston vs Aberdeen, from which Palmerston, the noisy interventionist, emerged the victor. Salisbury and then Edward Grey wrestled with the same dilemma in the context of imperialism (Salisbury) and the European balance of power (Grey). Finally Eden and Bevin, from wholly different backgrounds, combined with the Americans to create a post-war compromise, which served its purpose for half a century, but is coming apart today as the old questions resurface in new and savage forms in an era of terrorism and racial conflict.
- Sales Rank: #3014020 in Books
- Published on: 2011-04-12
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 8.50" h x 1.25" w x 5.40" l, 1.10 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 448 pages
Review
One of the great achievements of this thoughtful and elegant book is to emphasise the thread of continuity running through British foreign policy from the age of Napoleon to the cold war... a book of great authority and insight―SUNDAY TIMES
An entertaining book, enriched by the insights of an experienced practitioner―ECONOMIST
Douglas Hurd has done the impossible...he has produced a page-turning book about the history of British foreign policy―INDEPENDENT
Highly readable... Any future foreign secretary would be well advised to read this engrossing book on their first day in office―Jack Straw, OBSERVER
Hurd elegantly profiles eleven British foreign secretaries...Written with a lightness of touch despite its serious message, one only hopes David Miliband buys a copy―GQ
About the Author
Douglas Hurd was an MP from 1974 to 1997, he served as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary. He is the (co-)author of many thrillers, his MEMOIRS and the highly acclaimed ROBERT PEEL.
Most helpful customer reviews
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful.
peer-review of how predecessors addressed this challenge has the great advantage of being an “inside-job
By anupamifs
This book is about what Foreign Ministers – the British prefer to call them Foreign Secretaries – do. British politicians have an unusual tradition of writing biographies of each other. Unusual because the preference of those involved in the process of ruling has been, and continues to be, to transact their business in as opaque a manner as possible.
The subjects of his study are 11 Foreign Secretaries beginning with Canning, in 1807, and ending with Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary during much of World War II, and later in Churchills’s post-War government until he succeeded Churchill as PM in1955. It starts with Napoleon threatening England, runs through Britain’s ascent to sole superpower status in the 19th century, its decline and the World Wars in the 20th century, and its relegation to major power statuss. He does not explore the reasons for Britain’s stunning rise, and does not give reasons for its fall. Instead he focuses on how Britain’s top diplomats, practiced their statecraft at critical inflection points during this period.
All were exceptionally capable men. All, except Bevin, were highly–educated members of a very able aristocratic class. All wanted to be Foreign Secretaries at a time when the Foreign Secretary had the second most important job, and sometimes the most important job, in what was then the most important country in the world. For Disraeli, foreign policy was real politics; it was played out on the big stage, with a huge audience for the talented performer.” The “business of passing laws or guiding the budget were prosaic duties” for which Disraeli appointed “dull, competent” “middle class-worthies to handle.”
Mr. Hurd’s exercise of comparison is made easier by the longevity of diplomatic problems. The question of peace in Europe was the major issue that all these men had to tackle. Peace was first threatened by the ambitions of France, then by Germany, and lastly by Russia. Other events of historical importance such as the Industrial Revolution, imperialism and the colonies, such as India, find mention as peripheral or subordinate concerns.
Mr. Hurd’s unflinchingly honest, and sometimes scorching, peer-review of how predecessors addressed this challenge has the great advantage of being an “inside-job.” We obtain a vista of what the world looks like when one is Foreign Secretary. That by itself is not exceptional. A continuously growing body of diplomatic literature, including by a succession of US Secretaries of State, is available on the subject. What is different about this book is the attempt by Mr. Hurd to distill the essentials of statecraft to binary options – should a problem be tackled or ignored; to appease or to impose: to intervene with force or not; to act alone or with allies. If these are the weapons at the Foreign Secretaries disposal, then the selection of weapon is governed by another set of other binary choices: should one aim for stability or the promise of a better tomorrow? Should one lead public opinion or be a slave to it? Should the problem be tackled secretly or in the full glare of publicity? Why go through the effort of attempting substantial change when someone like Lloyd George “could display his charm and prowess and gain a fortnight’s prestige.”
How did the Foreign Secretaries make these choices? Some operated on the basis of reason. Others did so on the basis of emotion or ideology. Canning felt strongly that Britain had to be guided by principle and that Britain had a responsibility to propel liberty and national self-determination (with the notable exception of India!) more rapidly down their historical trajectory. Interventions should only be to strengthen liberty. Castlereagh and Grey felt differently as did Aberdeen. Palmerston was flamboyantly Canning-esque.
Mr. Hurd also demonstrates that there is much greater continuity than change in the practice of diplomacy. Methods have not changed much over two centuries. Diplomacy is still a personality-driven rather than system driven exercise. Truly great Foreign Secretaries, and one gets the feeling that only Salisbury and Castlereagh win Mr. Hurd’s approbation, differ from the rest in understanding the limits of both emotion and reason in choosing their weapons. They adapted to the situation and were adept at switching weapons when required. This allowed them to dominate events rather than be dominated by them. Foreign Secretaries who were not flexible invariably led England to war as in the case of Grey before World War I and Palmerston in Crimea. Castlereagh, on the other hand, created the concept of collective security, embodied in the outcomes of the Congress of Vienna, because he was pragmatic in his beliefs. The League of Nations and the United Nations owe their existence to his genius. Salisbury worked with Bismarck to ensure the longest peace in Europe. Salisbury and Castlereagh also had unusual force of personality. Wars, which many consider the ultimate foreign policy tool, are only punctuation marks in their strategies. They also proved adept at exploiting both liberal and conservative nostrums in accordance with the demands of the situation.
Mr Hurd is forgiving of Foreign Secretaries who were overcome by the situation instead of their best efforts. He is most scathing in his criticism of those, like Lloyd George, who chose “language fixes” and paper over intractable differences. Ultimately, diplomacy must reflect the fundamentals of the nation, as the last sad chapter on Bevan and Eden struggling to cope with Britain’s reduced circumstances after World War II describes. No amount of rhetoric or grandstanding can alter this fundamental reality. Mr. Hurd does not discuss whether Foreign Secretaries can learn the art of correctly assessing these fundamentals but does say that an appreciation and knowledge of history does seem to help.
There is a caveat that practitioners need to pay attention to. This book is about the foreign policy of a “satisfied” power that was interested largely in maintaining its possessions and status. The relevance of this to emerging powers, who occupy prominent positions in todays diplomatic systems, is academic.
Other than the creation of the concept of collective security, Mr. Hurd mentions two major changes in the practice of diplomacy over two centuries. The first is the growth of a professional diplomatic service. Castlereagh only had clerks. A hundred years later, Grey and Chamberlain had to contend with powerful Permanent Secretaries. The other is the growth of public interest in diplomacy . The term “public opinion” which today’s public diplomacy attempts to address, was courted first by Canning but seen as a double-edged sword by the likes of Salisbury.
The book abounds with anecdotes that flesh out the remarkable characters of a group of highly intelligent and accomplished men. From Sir Edward Grey’s devoting as much time to gardening as to the affairs of state; Austen Chamberlain’s fixation on winning paternal approval; Disraeli’s outrageous vanity and his equally outrageous flattery of Queen Victoria; and, Prince Albert interrupting Lord Palmerston’s attempts to seduce Royal ladies in waiting; and Bevin’s bad table manners; Mr. Hurd skillfully brings them all to life.
The high ground of strategic literature is occupied by Kissinger. This is a book, that in its scope and sweep, rivals Kissinger and deserves to be atleast as influential.
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful.
great book poor delievery
By Amazon Customer
The book itself is superb, beautifully written and factually correct, but I was very disappointed by how long it took for the book to arrive, about a month!! so I will not be buying from that vendor again.
Choose Your Weapons, by Douglas Hurd PDF
Choose Your Weapons, by Douglas Hurd EPub
Choose Your Weapons, by Douglas Hurd Doc
Choose Your Weapons, by Douglas Hurd iBooks
Choose Your Weapons, by Douglas Hurd rtf
Choose Your Weapons, by Douglas Hurd Mobipocket
Choose Your Weapons, by Douglas Hurd Kindle
